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The costs of foreclosure often spill over from foreclosed properties to other nearby properties. This short 
paper reviews some of the research on foreclosure’s price-depressing impact on sales of nearby 
properties, only one of several forms of spillover effects. The studies reviewed here focus on various 
cities, use different datasets and methodologies, employ different assumptions, and cover different time 
periods. Their conclusions about foreclosure effects range from reducing nearby properties’ sales value 
by as little as 0.9% to as much as 8.7%. Research also shows that negative spillover effects tend to 
diminish with distance and time, as does the marginal impact of each additional foreclosure. This paper 
also presents two studies with rough estimates on New England communities’ possible losses from 
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Discussions on foreclosure prevention and intervention often focus on 
the occupants of the foreclosed properties. Nonetheless, research has 
shown that the harm caused by foreclosures frequently goes beyond the 
physical walls of foreclosed homes, devastating the local communities as 
well. Foreclosure’s spillover effects, often referred to as (negative) 
externalities, vary in form: lowering nearby property values, reducing the 
local property tax base, increasing blight and crime, disrupting social ties, 
etc. An early survey of major U.S. cities’ leaders shows that destruction 
of housing/neighborhood vitality, rising crime rates, and reduced 
commercial activity are the top concerns for foreclosed/vacant properties’ 
spillover effects. (Accordino and G. Johnson, 2000)  Despite this variety 
of spillover effects, this review focuses on foreclosures’ price-depressing 
spillover effects on nearby properties. 
 
Economic Reasoning and Early Research 
Foreclosures could negatively impact nearby housing values via three 
primary channels: blight, valuation, and supply. Prior to entering 
foreclosure on their properties, owners with delinquent mortgages 
usually have limited financial means to properly maintain and/or upgrade 
their houses. This in turn frequently leads to physical blight because of 
the declining housing conditions. After the delinquent owners foreclose, 
such properties may be vacant for some time, which attracts vandalism 
and crime, further exacerbating the blight, making the neighborhood 
undesirable for potential homebuyers. Secondly, foreclosed properties 
are usually sold at a significant discount. Property is appraised partially 
on the basis of sales of nearby comparable properties, and the 
discounted sales of foreclosed properties could therefore lower such 
valuation benchmarks. Lastly, a high concentration of foreclosures could 
potentially increase the local supply of available properties and lower the 
values of nearby homes, especially in areas with a stable housing 
demand. 
 
Early surveys of Minneapolis area foreclosure prevention programs 
estimate that a foreclosed home could cost neighborhoods as much as 
$10,000, mostly in the form of lower housing values. (Moreno, 1995) 
Another early study uses 1992-1994 property tax delinquency data in 
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residential property’s sale price decreases by $788 when the “nearby 
area” has one percentage point increase in property tax delinquency—
while holding other conditions constant. (Simons and et al, 1998) 
Nonetheless, “nearby property” in this study is defined as being on the 
same page of the county auditor’s map book as the foreclosed property. 
This definition is rather problematic because of the lack of spatial 
consistency. Adjacent properties could be on two separate pages by 
arbitrary page division. That being said, this is one of the early studies 
using mathematical models to quantify the spillover effects of 
foreclosures.   
 
Recent Improved Research and Findings 
As the risk of foreclosure began to increase, two 2006 studies signaled a 
new approach to understanding foreclosures’ spillover effects and used 
more sophisticated mathematical models. Shlay and Whitman find that 
the presence of abandoned properties in Philadelphia depresses the 
prices of properties located within 150 feet by $7,627, but this negative 
effect diminishes with distance. (Shlay and Whitman, 2006) Using a 
similar regression model, a widely cited study by Immergluck and Smith 
examines foreclosures’ spillover impacts on Chicago home sales in 
1999. It estimates that, on average, a foreclosure within one-eighth mile 
of a single-family home could lower its sale price by 0.9%—holding other 
conditions constant. (Immergluck and Smith, 2006)
   
 
Despite these two studies’ pioneering roles in refining the mathematical 
models to quantify spillover effects, they are subject to some 
methodological limitations. For instance, possible multicollinearity (i.e., 
independent variables highly correlated among one another) and reverse 
causation are either unaddressed or weakly controlled. Discussion on 
foreclosures’ longitudinal and spatial aspects, as well as the nonlinearity 
of their marginal effects, is very limited or absent. Three recent studies 
improve on some of these limitations.  
 
Been’s research on New York City indicates that additional pre-
foreclosures (i.e., properties with pending foreclosure petitions) have 
diminishing marginal spillover effects. (Been, 2008) This study does not 
directly quantify the marginal impact of additional pre-foreclosures, but  
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rather it aggregates its spillover effects by a neighborhood’s foreclosure 
exposure
1 and the number of foreclosure petitions in the area. The 
diminishing spillover effects could therefore be indirectly illustrated by the 
declining average effect of each pre-foreclosure on a nearby property’s 
sale price as the number of foreclosures increases in the area (see table 






Number of nearby pre-
foreclosures 
Total effects of these pre-
foreclosures on a nearby 
property’s sale price 
Average effect of each pre-
foreclosure on a nearby 
property’s sale price 
2 
1 to 2   - 1.8%  - 1.8% to -0.9% 
Low Exposure 
1 
3 to 5  - 2.8%  -0.93% to -0.56%  
9 to 19  - 2.5%  -0.27% to -0.13% 
High Exposure 
1 
≥ 20  - 3.7%  ≤ -0.185% 


































































































1 - 2 3 - 5 9 - 19 20+
Number of Nearby Pre-foreclosures
Low-exposure neigbhorhoods High-exposure neigbhorhoods
Author's calculation, raw data based on Been (2008)
 
                                                 
1 “Low exposure” here means that the neighborhood’s median home sale is within 1,000 feet of only one property with foreclosure 
petitions; while “high exposure” means more than 15 properties have foreclosure petitions.  
2 Calculated by dividing the “total effects of these pre-foreclosures on a nearby property’s sale price” by the “number of pre-
foreclosures.” Although this method is imperfect, it helps approximate the rough marginal effect of each additional pre-foreclosure. 
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Although it is not explicit in its intent, Been’s study is one of the few that 
attempt to assess the nonlinearity of foreclosures’ marginal effects when 
the number of pre-foreclosures increases. Its findings suggest the 
importance of preventing early foreclosures from happening in the first 
place since they tend to have bigger price-depressing effects on nearby 
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With an improved model and newer data from Chicago, Lin et al. analyze 
foreclosure spillover effects with special attention to their longitudinal and 
spatial aspects. (Lin et al., 2009) Their research shows that such 
spillover effects tend to be significant within ~0.6 miles and 5 years of 
foreclosure. The price-depressing effect is most severe (-8.7%) on 
adjacent properties within 2 years of foreclosure, and it diminishes to as 
low as -1.7% at about 0.6 miles (0.9km) away (see chart above). 
Been’s findings 
suggest the importance 
of preventing early 
foreclosures from 
happening in the first 
place since they tend 
to have bigger price-
depressing effects.  
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Similarly, the price-depressing effect diminishes with time: it lowers 
nearby homes’ sales price by as much as -8.7% within the first 2 years of 
foreclosure, and this effect weakens to -5.5% within 3-5 years, and -4.4% 
after 6 years. Foreclosures have virtually no negative effect beyond 
~0.25 miles (0.4km) if the foreclosure is six or more years in the past. 
Furthermore, this study also shows that the intensity of the spillover 
effects is closely tied to housing cycles and could be reduced by about 
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  Distance from foreclosed/abandoned properties
Note: Hollow markers indicate that the coefficients are not statistically significant.  Source: Mikelbank (forthcoming)
 
 
Using 2006 Columbus, Ohio, data, Mikelbank separates the spillover 
effect of pre-foreclosures from that of vacant/abandoned properties and 
corrects spatial errors in regression models.
3 Mikelbank concludes that 
pre-foreclosures’ negative impact on nearby homes’ sales prices is less 
than that of vacant/abandoned properties, but it is more spatially 
persistent (see chart above). For instance, a pre-foreclosure within 250 
                                                 
3 Spatial errors exist when a regression model does not control for, or controls but with significant deficiency, unmeasured 
neighborhood influences common to houses in physical proximity. 
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feet of a property, on average, could impact its sale price by -2.1%—
holding other conditions constant—but such impact intensifies to -3.6% 
for a vacant/abandoned property. Nonetheless, pre-foreclosure’s 
negative impact diminishes to -1.6% (i.e., a reduction of half a 
percentage point in intensity) as the distance increases to 250-500 feet; 
while a vacant/abandoned property’s negative impact drastically 
decreases to merely -0.6% at the same distance (i.e., a reduction of 
three percentage-points in intensity).      
 
 
Foreclosure Spillover Effects: What They Mean for New England 
Communities 
Despite the fact that these studies focus on different cities, use different 
methodologies and data sets, employ different assumptions, and cover 
different time periods, they all confirm that foreclosures not only hurt 
those individuals losing their homes, but also could depress nearby 
properties’ sales prices. These studies also suggest that foreclosures 
often tend to have more far-reaching negative spillover impacts spatially 
and longitudinally compared with other undesirable conditions such as 
abandoned properties. To combat such negative externalities, it is 
probably more effective to prevent initial foreclosures from happening 
since they tend to have more severe price-depressing effects than later 
foreclosures.  
 
The studies all focus on a specific city, so their findings, especially the 
quantitative conclusions, cannot be generalized for New England, as 
local housing market conditions and spatial features could critically alter 
these spillover effects. Nevertheless, two other reports do provide back-
of-the-envelope estimates of spillover effects in the region. Both reports 
use generic multipliers, such as the price-depressing coefficient of -0.9% 
seen in Immergluck and Smith’s Chicago study, which may not fit many 
local conditions in New England. Therefore, these two reports’ estimates 
are coarse and in these two reports are coarse and require cautious 
interpretation.  
 
A report by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) provides 
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associated with foreclosures of subprime mortgages originated in 2005 
and 2006. CRL’s projection is based on 2005-2006 owner-occupied first-
lien subprime mortgages—a subset of the subprime loan pool. Because 
CRL’s estimates rely on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, it 
uses high-cost loans as an indicator of subprime, and only includes 
reported loans required by HMDA regulations (e.g., mostly in 
metropolitan statistical areas). Lastly, it uses the price-depressing 
coefficient of -0.9% concluded in Immergluck and Smith’s Chicago study 
to model for all geographies in the United States. 
 
Because of these various limitations, CRL’s projections should be 
interpreted with caution. For instance, instead of using Immergluck and 
Smith’s -0.9% price-depressing coefficient uniformly to approximate 
every foreclosure’s impact, one might take into account Been’s findings 
that each additional foreclosure has a diminishing negative impact. At the 
higher extreme, the price-depressing impact would be twice as severe (a 
1.8% drop in property value) as what CRL’s estimate suggests if all of 
the impacted properties have no more than two foreclosed homes within 
1,000 feet. Nonetheless, at the lower extreme, this price-depressing 
impact would be only one-fifth as severe (a 0.185% drop) compared with 
CRL’s estimate if all of the impacted properties have 20 or more 
foreclosed homes within 1,000 feet. Because foreclosures have tended 
to be spatially concentrated, the price-depressing impacts of each 
additional foreclosure would be in the direction of the lower extreme. For 
instance, about 50% of the Massachusetts properties with foreclosure 
petitions and/or foreclosure auctions in 2007 clustered in 50-60 ZIP code 
areas (i.e., 10%) out of Massachusetts’ roughly 500 ZIP code areas.
4 Of 
course both of these two assumptions are extreme scenarios, but they 
help demonstrate that an accurate estimate is based on local real estate 





                                                 
4 There are more than 500 ZIP codes in Massachusetts, but we excluded the ones that are reserved for P.O. Boxes/institutions 
(e.g., universities) and those without residential properties. Granted that ZIP code areas vary in size and housing density,, our 
calculation at least shows that foreclosures are highly concentrated spatially. The raw data are from the Warren Group.  
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Estimates of 2005-2006 Subprime Foreclosures' Spillover Effects on New England Communities 
 County/State  








































 Fairfield CT    12,552    19.5%   10.5%   1,318   118,494    424,638,223   3,584 
 Hartford CT    13,234    24.8%   14.2%   1,879   128,713    260,004,353   2,020 
 Middlesex CT    1,943    16.8%   14.2%   276   8,872    16,529,626   1,863 
 New Haven CT    15,299    27.4%   16.0%   2,448   159,366    399,428,512   2,506 
 New London CT    4,045    22.9%   15.1%   611   20,585    43,140,252   2,096 
 Tolland CT    1,555    17.7%   14.2%   221   4,988    9,614,145   1,927 
Total / Average of CT    48,628    23.0%   13.9%   6,753   441,018   1,153,355,110   2,615 
 Androscoggin ME    1,881    29.1%   13.5%   254   6,840    8,703,989   1,272 
 Cumberland ME    3,635    17.7%   17.8%   647   20,018    42,929,761   2,145 
 Penobscot ME    2,526    30.7%   13.3%   336   5,430    6,649,831   1,225 
 Sagadahoc ME    445    18.8%   17.8%   79   734    1,207,311   1,646 
 York ME    3,353    20.9%   17.8%   597   9,105    16,497,187   1,812 
Total / Average of ME    11,840    22.1%   16.2%   1,913   42,127    75,988,080   1,804 
Barnstable MA   3,629  18.6% 19.9%  722 20,445  60,950,517  2,981 
Berkshire MA   1,166  16.2% 12.0%  140 5,972  8,273,301  1,385 
Bristol MA   7,818  20.8% 19.5%  1,525 99,946  321,218,252  3,214 
Essex MA   10,505  19.7% 16.9%  1,775 129,095  549,401,455  4,256 
Franklin MA   812  19.2% 15.4%  125 2,395  3,643,952  1,521 
Hampden MA   8,636  30.8% 15.4%  1,330 80,836  166,366,190  2,058 
Hampshire MA   1,094  13.9% 15.4%  168 3,177  7,148,109  2,250 
Middlesex MA   13,210  14.5% 16.5%  2,180 201,932  816,181,670  4,042 
Norfolk MA   6,544  14.4% 18.5%  1,211 79,181  299,335,942  3,780 
Plymouth MA   9,327  22.3% 18.5%  1,725 55,214  210,177,059  3,807 
Suffolk MA   8,938  23.1% 18.5%  1,654 231,447  1,831,459,276  7,913 
Worcester MA   13,346  23.0% 17.3%  2,309 103,907  246,010,808  2,368 
Total / Average of MA   85,025  19.6% 17.5%  14,864 1,013,548  4,520,166,531  4,460 
 Hillsborough NH    5,524    18.8%   14.3%   790   41,289    78,763,927   1,908 
 Rockingham NH    4,088    17.3%   15.6%   638   10,619    26,152,162   2,463 
 Strafford NH    1,792    21.9%   15.6%   280   5,720    9,944,156   1,739 
Total / Average of NH    11,404    18.6%   15.0%   1,707   57,628    114,860,244   1,993 
 Bristol RI    483    14.4%   19.5%   94   5,065    14,010,606   2,766 
 Kent RI    4,199    26.4%   19.5%   819   42,040    110,666,338   2,632 
 Newport RI    764    13.9%   19.5%   149   8,746    27,591,890   3,155 
 Providence RI    14,642    32.7%   19.5%   2,855   183,453    802,320,325   4,373 
 Washington RI    1,528    16.7%   19.5%   298   5,119    14,226,120   2,779 
Total / Average of RI    21,616    27.5%   19.5%   4,215   244,424    968,815,279   3,964 
 Chittenden VT    1,016    10.8%   15.1%   153   5,001    9,989,651   1,997 
 Franklin VT    671    20.9%   15.1%   101   1,419    2,230,472   1,572 
 Grand Isle VT    99    20.8%   15.1%   15   40    73,150   1,836 
Total / Average of VT    1,786    13.7%   15.1%   270   6,460    12,293,273   1,903 
Total / Ave of New England  180,299  12.1% 16.5%  29,722 1,805,205  6,845,478,517  3,792
Source: Center for Responsible Lending (2008)  
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Another report, released by the Majority Staff of the Joint Economic 
Committee (MSJEC) of the U.S. Congress, takes a different approach 
from the CRL study. It forecasts the cumulative effects covering the 
period from the second quarter of 2007 to the end of 2009. It assumes 
that all foreclosures during this period are entirely a result of subprime 
loans that were still active as of March 2007—a very coarse assumption. 
For instance, Mortgage Bankers Association data show that only about 
55% to 66% of the foreclosures in New England between Q1 2006 and 
Q2 2008 are related to subprime mortgages, and subprime mortgages’ 
share in foreclosures has been on the decline since Q2 2007. This 
means that about one-third to one-half (and possibly more if the current 
trend continues) of the foreclosures in New England are from prime 
loans, which MSJEC’s estimate does not include. MSJEC’s report 
therefore may have underestimated the number of potential foreclosures. 
However, in using the price-depressing coefficient of -0.9% from 
Immergluck and Smith’s Chicago study, MSJEC’s report may have 
overestimated because of the limitations of using the -0.9% coefficient as 
discussed earlier. MSJEC’s estimates for the New England region are 
listed below: 
 
Estimated Impact of Subprime Foreclosures on Property Values and Property Taxes (Q3 2007 – Q4 2009) 
 Estimated Cumulative Loss of  
Property Value  
(in 2007 dollars)  
 Estimated Cumulative Loss of  
Property Taxes  




















4Q09   Total Direct  Neighborhood  Total  Direct  Neighborhood
CT    83,575   $282,815    14,079    $1,405,560,135   $874,646,011   $530,914,124  $19,040,191   $11,848,249   $7,191,941 
ME    24,460   $185,475    5,583    $296,733,417   $224,333,232   $72,400,186   $3,076,978    $2,326,224   $750,754 
MA    115,780   $323,303    22,292    $3,009,182,395   $1,557,268,422   $1,451,913,973  $25,956,635   $13,432,701   $12,523,934 
NH   30,544   $250,101    4,302    $461,256,428   $231,094,893   $230,161,535   $7,534,584    $3,774,915   $3,759,669 
RI   26,033   $269,181    5,833    $662,456,460   $328,832,356   $333,624,104   $7,137,593    $3,542,982   $3,594,611 
VT   6,289   $202,856    1,316    $73,332,809   $56,894,221   $16,438,588   $1,153,567    $894,979   $258,588 
Source: The Majority Staff of the Joint Economic Committee. (2007)  
 
The differences in these two reports’ projections result partly from their 
different objectives, data sets, assumptions, and methodologies. Clearly, 
it is a challenge to accurately gauge the spillover effects at the local 
level, given the uniqueness of each real estate market. Furthermore,  
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lower house values in turn also reduce the net worth of the homeowners 
and their communities, often limiting their economic mobility and 
prospects. Such induced effects are not included in the discussion, and it 
would be difficult to quantify them.  
 
Although the actual extent of foreclosures’ spillover effects on New 
England communities needs further research, all studies examined agree 
that foreclosures’ detrimental impacts are communal. That is why 
foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts need to go beyond the 
physical constraints of individual foreclosed houses and instead embrace 





COMMUNITY AFFAIRS DISCUSSION PAPER   ▪   2008-01   ▪   11
Foreclosure’s Price-Depressing Spillover Effects on Local Properties: A Literature Review 
References:  
 
Accordino, J., and G. Johnson. (2000) “Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned Property Problem,” Journal on Urban Affairs 22 (3): 
301-315. 
 
Been, V. (May 21, 2008) “External Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures: Evidence from New York City.” Testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives.  
 
Center for Responsible Lending. (January 18, 2008). CRL Issue Paper: Subprime Spillover. 
 
Immergluck, D., and G. Smith. (2006) “The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on 
Property Values,” Housing Policy Debate 17 (1): 57-79. 
 
Lin, Z, E. Rosenblatt, and V. Yao. (2009) “Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values,” Journal of Real 
Estate Finance Economics 38 (4). 
 
Mikelbank, B. (forthcoming) “Spatial Analysis of the Impact of Vacant, Abandoned and Foreclosed Properties.” Spatial errors exist 
when a regression model does not capture, or captures but with significant deficiency, unmeasured neighborhood influences 
common to houses in physical proximity.  
 
Moreno, A. (1995) The Cost-Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention. Minneapolis: Family Housing Fund.  
 
Shlay, A., and G. Whitman. (2006) “Research for Democracy: Linking Community Organizing and Research to Leverage Blight 
Policy,” City & Community 5 (2): 153-171. 
 
Simons, R., R. Quercia, and I. Maric. (1998) “The Value Impact of New Residential Construction and Neighborhood Disinvestment 
on Residential Sales Price,” Journal of Real Estate Research 15 (1/2): 147-161. 
 
The Majority Staff of the Joint Economic Committee. (October 2007) . The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on 
Wealth, Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 